Prospective Constitutional Changes in Kosovo Emanating from the EU Pre-Accession Process by Visar Morina
299CYELP 12 [2016] 299-317
PROSPECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN KOSOVO 
EMANATING FROM THE EU PRE-ACCESSION PROCESS
Visar Morina*
Summary: Although Kosovo is in the initial period of its European inte-
gration process, this article will analyse the extent to which the 2008 
Kosovo Constitution is compatible with EU law. Integration in the Eu-
ropean Union is one of the key objectives of Kosovo’s constitutional 
preamble and the paper will discuss the prospective constitutional 
amendments that will occur in Kosovo in anticipation of accession to 
the European Union. The author’s position is that a great part of consti-
tutional non-compliance with EU law can be solved through constitu-
tional interpretation (eg the partial transfer of sovereignty), while other 
issues will require parliamentary intervention through constitutional 
amendments, a process which does not always run without difficulty 
in Kosovo’s democracy. In this paper, it is argued that the Kosovo Con-
stitution will require a small package of constitutional amendments 
during the pre-accession process. Constitutional amendments will be 
required to ensure the precedence of EU law, but also to ensure that 
the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by 
citizens of the EU is guaranteed. Further, the article analyses the kind 
of impact the EU integration process will have on other specific consti-
tutional issues in Kosovo, such as freedom of movement and the sur-
render of nationals to other Member States, and what constitutional 
choices there are to avoid any contradiction between the Constitution 
and EU law. The study takes into account constitutional adaptations 
in several Central and Southeast European countries on their path to-
wards EU integration, which can serve as guidelines for the decision-
making authorities in Kosovo to identify constitutional gaps and flaws 
in the course of the EU pre-accession process.  
1 Introduction
Kosovo is at an early stage of its path towards European integration 
compared to other countries of the Western Balkans.1 Only in 2016 did 
Kosovo ratify the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), which is 
* Dr Visar Morina is Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Prishtina in 
Kosovo, email visar.morina@uni-pr.edu. This study has been supported by funding from 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung – Kosovo.
1 For an overview of the European Integration process on the Western Balkans, see Ro-
berto Belloni, ‘European Integration and the Western Balkans: Lessons, Prospects and Ob-
stacles’ (2009) Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 313. 
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the first formal agreement between the European Union (EU) and Kosovo 
on enhancing political dialogue, closer trade integration, including open-
ing EU markets to Kosovo’s industrial and agricultural products. The 
ratification of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo 
was made with a ‘status neutrality’ approach given that several Member 
States had not yet recognised the independence of Kosovo, impeding ob-
viously its EU integration prospects. As the 2015 EU progress report for 
Kosovo observed, among the key elements of Kosovo’s process towards 
EU integration is the alignment of its legislation with the EU acquis.2  In 
a broader context, such legislative alignment with EU norms includes a 
Constitution that permits the EU accession process. As shown by the ex-
perience of the countries that have joined the EU, constitutional adapta-
tion has been necessary before and after accession to ensure compliance 
with EU treaties. Such constitutional changes originating from the EU in-
tegration process have been wide-ranging and have led to what Rodin has 
termed a ‘constitutional revolution’.3 One recent example of the impact of 
the EU integration process on the Kosovo Constitution is a recent consti-
tutional amendment that changed the balance of the composition of the 
Kosovo Judicial Council (the KJC) in favour of the judiciary. Previously, 
the majority of the members of the KJC were elected by the Assembly 
of Kosovo (AoK), which prompted the European Commission to address 
critical remarks that this constitutional arrangement may lead to strong 
political interference and can jeopardise the independence of the judici-
ary by the political parties represented in the Assembly.4  In an effort to 
meet the EU integration requirements for the independence of the judici-
ary, the AoK adopted a constitutional amendment by which the majority 
of a 13-member Council are to be elected by members from the judiciary. 
With the aim of discussing further constitutional adaptations that 
may occur before Kosovo’s accession to the EU, this paper will examine 
the implications that the EU integration process will have on the current 
Constitution and potential amendments originating from this process. 
Comparative constitutional law provides a score of useful examples re-
garding constitutional alignment with the EU Treaties, particularly the 
cases of Slovenia and Croatia, which may serve as a useful roadmap for 
constitutional adaptations in Kosovo prior to accession to the EU. 
2 The report is available at <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_docu-
ments/2015/20151110_report_kosovo.pdf> accessed 21 November 2016.
3 Siniša Rodin, ‘Pridruživanje Hrvatske Europskoj uniji: preobrazba pravnog sustava’ in 
Katarina Ott (ed). Pridruživanje Hrvatske Europskoj uniji: Izazovi ekonomske i pravne prila-
godbe (Institute of Public Finance and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2003). See also Michael 
Baun and Dan Marek, The New Member States and the European Union: Foreign Policy and 
Europeanization (Routledge 2013).
4 The 2015 EU progress report for Kosovo (n 2). 
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Initially, a brief overview is provided of the Kosovo Constitution and 
its amendments, followed by an elaboration of the status of international 
law in the Kosovo Constitution. As will be discussed below, the Kosovo 
Constitution is among the newest in the world, and was drafted under 
robust international supervision in order to accommodate the require-
ments originating from Martti Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status Settlement (hereinafter: the Ahtisaari Plan).5  With regard 
to EU integration, the paper will discuss the constitutional basis for Ko-
sovo’s accession to the EU and will examine several specific constitution-
al issues which may require modification during the EU pre-accession 
process, such as the right to vote, the freedom of movement and the 
extradition of nationals. While constitutional changes other than those 
discussed below can yet emerge during negotiations with the EU, this 
article only attempts to shed light on specific constitutional adaptations 
required during Kosovo’s pre-accession process by providing concrete 
proposals for constitutional change to ensure compliance with the EU 
treaties. Besides this, the constitutional adaptations that have occurred 
in Central and Southeast European countries will be considered. These 
can be useful for Kosovo when addressing constitutional issues in the 
course of the EU pre-accession process.  
2 The Kosovo Constitution: a brief overview
In 2008, Kosovo adopted its Constitution which, by and large, was 
designed within the parameters set forth in the Ahtisaari Plan.6 The Con-
stitution follows the patterns of a modern constitution in terms of the in-
stitutional structures premised upon the separation of powers but also in 
the context of individual constitutional guarantees through a catalogue 
of constitutional rights and freedoms entrenched in Chapter 2. Given 
that the constitutional drafting process was internationally supervised, 
the preamble of the Constitution is not rooted in the country’s historical 
foundations, but it merely states Kosovo’s aspirations for Euro-Atlan-
tic values and European integration.7 The Constitution also contains a 
set of constitutional values that are supposed to guide understanding 
of the Constitution and devotes a special chapter promoting the rights 
and freedoms of the non-majority communities. These are specific rights 
that are provided in addition to those guaranteed in the Constitution’s 
5 Martti Ahtisaari was a United Nations Special Envoy to Kosovo.
6 Joseph Marko, ‘New Kosovo Constitution in a Regional Comparative Perspective’ (2008) 
33 Review of Central and East European Law 437; Dren Doli and Fisnik Korenica, ‘Calling 
Kosovo’s Constitution: A Legal Review’ (2010) 22 Denning Law Journal 51; John Tunheim, 
‘Rule of Law and the Kosovo Constitution’ (2009) 18 Minnesota Journal for International 
Law 371.
7 Marko (n 6) 437.
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catalogue of human rights.8 These rights of the communities contain ex-
tensive constitutional guarantees to enable adequate representation of 
non-majority communities in Kosovo in almost every aspect of public 
life.9 For example, members of non-majority communities are guaran-
teed reserved seats or membership in the Assembly of Kosovo but also in 
the Government and judiciary, including two judgeship positions at the 
Constitutional Court.10 The Constitution has established a parliamentary 
republic whereby the government led by a prime minister is collectively 
responsible before the Parliament.11 The head of state is elected by the 
Assembly and is responsible to ensure the constitutional functioning of 
state institutions.12 The head of state has limited competences in the area 
of legislation (the President enjoys the constitutional right to veto laws 
passed by the Assembly) and in the justice sector since it has the power 
to appoint judges and prosecutors upon proposals of the Kosovo Judicial 
or Prosecutorial Council.13 Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Kosovo 
Constitution is quite rigid given the procedures that are required for its 
amendment. Draft constitutional amendments require initially an a priori 
review by the Kosovo Constitutional Court (KCC), and a two-thirds quali-
fied parliamentary majority, including two thirds (2/3) of all deputies of 
the Assembly holding reserved or guaranteed seats for representatives of 
non-majority communities in Kosovo.14  Since the entry into force of the 
Constitution in June 2008, a total of 25 constitutional amendments have 
been adopted. There are two main factors that have contributed to this 
high number of constitutional amendments in a little less than a dec-
ade since the enactment of the Constitution. First, the 22 constitutional 
amendments enacted in September 2012 came as a result of the termina-
tion of Kosovo’s international supervised independence.15 The result was 
that the International Civilian Office (ICO), which was established after 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, terminated its mandate, a decision 
which paved the way for the full enjoyment of the powers of state insti-
8 Kosovo Constitution, art 57.
9 Emma Lantschner, ‘Protection of Minority Communities in Kosovo: Legally Ahead of Eu-
ropean Standards –Practically Still a Long Way to Go’ (2008) 33 Review of Central and East 
European Law 451-490.
10 See the Kosovo Constitution, arts 62, 65, 96, 108 and 114.
11 Kosovo Constitution, art 97(1).
12 ibid, art 84.
13 ibid, art 84.
14 ibid, art 144. 
15 As already mentioned, the first 22 amendments were adopted in 2012 related to the 
ending of the international supervision of the independence of Kosovo. Amendment no 23 
gave the Kosovo Assembly the power to grant amnesty while constitutional amendment 
no 24 adopted in 2015 provided for the establishment of the Specialist Chambers and the 
Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. For more details, see the Official Gazette in Kosovo <http://
gzk.rks-gov.net/ActsByCategoryInst.aspx?Index=1&InstID=1&CatID=1> accessed 18 No-
vember 2016.
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tutions. The other factor that triggered constitutional changes in Kosovo 
in 2015 was the international community’s call for the establishment of 
specialised courts to try crimes allegedly committed in 1999-2000. In re-
sponse to this call, the Assembly passed constitutional amendments and 
Law No 05/L-053 to enable the establishment of the Specialist Cham-
bers and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office.16 The Specialist Chambers 
will have jurisdiction for crimes within their subject matter jurisdiction 
which occurred between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2000 and will 
have primacy over all other courts in Kosovo.17 In 2016, the Assembly 
passed Constitutional Amendment no 25 to ensure that the majority of 
Kosovo Judicial Council members are elected by their peers in line with 
the Venice Commission recommendations.18  
3 EU law supremacy 
One of the key principles of EU law is the principle of supremacy. 
Article I-6 of the abandoned Constitutional Treaty provided that ‘the Con-
stitution and law adopted by the institutions of the Union in exercis-
ing competences conferred on it shall have primacy over the law of the 
Member States’. While some of the articles of the Lisbon Treaty imply the 
principle of EU law supremacy, such as article 4(34) TEU (which requires 
Member States to comply and not to hinder the objectives of the Union) or 
article 288 TFEU (on the direct applicability of the Regulations), nowhere 
does the Lisbon Treaty mention that EU law enjoys supremacy over na-
tional legislation. As Foster argues, the Lisbon Treaty ‘sidestepped the 
direct expression of supremacy that was contained in Article I-6 CT by 
adding a Declaration (No 17) that instead supports supremacy by refer-
ence to the case law of the CoJ on supremacy’.19 Indeed the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) has given special consideration to the principle 
of supremacy until it becomes accepted by the legal systems of the EU 
Member States.20 In other words, it was the ECJ which ‘took the lead in 
providing basic constitutional principles on which the new legal order 
was based’.21 
There are two important issues that deserve further elaboration re-
garding the supremacy of EU law. The first is related to the relationship 
16 The law is available in the Official Gazette of Kosovo at <http://gzk.rks-gov.net> ac-
cessed 21 November 2016. 
17 Law No 05/L-053 on Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, arts 
6-10.
18 The 2015 EU progress report for Kosovo (n 2). 
19  Nigel Foster, EU Law Directions (OUP 2016) 136. 
20 Evelyn Ellis and Philippa Watson, EU Anti-Discrimination Law (OUP 2012) 45. See also 
Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 1, 12 (English special edition).
21 Foster (n 19) 137.
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between national constitutions and EU law. There are several examples of 
how EU Member States have approached the question of the relationship 
between their constitutions and EU law depending on the constitutional 
tradition and the specifics of the national legal systems. In some states, 
like France and the Czech Republic, the relations between the Constitu-
tion and EU law are to be found in the context of the ratification of inter-
national agreements. For example, article 55 of the French Constitution 
accords supremacy to a ratified international treaty over national law. 
The same approach is followed by the Constitution of the Czech Republic, 
which in its article 10 states that every international treaty ratified by the 
Parliament of the Czech Republic is part of the Czech legislative order 
and takes precedence over all other laws.22 Some other countries, such 
as Greece and Ireland, were forced to make constitutional changes to 
reconcile the primacy of their constitutions with the supremacy of Union 
law.23 These constitutions have opted for the express mentioning of the 
supremacy of international law over national law. Article 28 of the Greek 
Constitution provides for the direct supremacy of international conven-
tions, including EU treaties, over national legislation.24 But as EU law 
developments have unfolded, harmonisation of the supremacy of Union 
law with the primacy of national constitutions has generated so-called 
constitutional tolerance among members of the European Union. Such 
constitutional tolerance, as academic commentators argue, is premised 
on the concept that ‘while the authority and reach of EU law is ultimately 
for national constitutional courts to decide, these courts commit them-
selves to recognize the special status of EU law’.25 This approach for the 
relative supremacy of EU law has been strongly echoed by a number of 
national constitutional courts along the lines of constitutional identity 
and fundamental rights guaranteed by national constitutions.26 Such 
conflicts between national and EU law have arisen in Germany, France 
and Italy, where constitutional courts have determined the limits of the 
acceptance of EU supremacy within the national constitutional order.27 
22 Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (OUP 2015) 308.
23 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law: Cases and 
Materials (CUP 2010) 190.
24 Under art 28 of the Greek Constitution ‘1) The generally recognized rules of international 
law and the international conventions after their ratification by law and their having been 
put into effect in accordance with their respective terms, shall constitute an integral part 
of Greek law and override any law provision to the contrary. The application of the rules of 
international law and international conventions in the case of aliens shall always be effected 
on condition of reciprocity’.
25 Chalmers (n 23) 194.
26 See, for example, the case decided by the German Constitutional Court, Solange I (1974) 
2 CMLR 540, 550-1. The court’s view in this case was that as long as EU law is able to 
secure the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the German Constitution, the 
principle of the supremacy of EU can be applied.
27 Craig and de Búrca (n 22) 278.
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The Polish Constitutional Court has also introduced ‘firm limits on the 
acceptance of EU law’ by arguing that the ‘Constitution shall be the su-
preme law in Poland and the Polish courts have made clear that EU law 
does not take precedence over the Constitution’.28 The Constitutional 
Court argued that ‘the precedence over statutes of the application of 
international agreements which were ratified on the basis of a statu-
tory authorization or consent granted… in no way signifies an analogous 
precedence of these agreements over the Constitution’.29 
The second issue concerns the relationship between EU law and do-
mestic laws and this is clearly less problematic compared to the previous 
issue because the ECJ has from early on taken a position that national 
parliaments cannot unilaterally introduce laws that would be in con-
flict with EU law. As argued in Costa v Enel, ‘by contrast with ordinary 
international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system 
which, on the entry into force of the treaty, became an integral part of 
the legal systems of the member states and which their courts are bound 
to apply’.30 According to the ECJ, ‘the transfer by the states from their 
domestic legal system to the community legal system of the rights and 
obligations arising under the treaty carries with it a permanent limita-
tion of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act 
incompatible with the concept of the community cannot prevail’.31
As stated in the introduction, since Kosovo is not a member of the 
European Union, the issue of EU law primacy may not be relevant at 
the current phase of Kosovo’s relationship with the EU. However, one 
of the first issues to be considered when Kosovo is ready to join the EU 
is whether EU law supremacy is implied in the Kosovo Constitution 
and whether such supremacy can be ensured without amending the 
Constitution. It should be noted that the Constitution does not address 
the relationship with EU law. While the supremacy of the Constitution is 
provided in article 16, nowhere does the Kosovo Constitution provide for 
the precedence of EU law over the provisions of national law. 
But while the express supremacy of EU law is missing, the Kosovo 
Constitution provides for the precedence of international agreements and 
legally binding norms of international law over national laws. Whether 
the primacy of EU law can be sufficiently ensured on this basis is ques-
tionable given the unique nature of EU law as a supra-national law. One 
argument in support of this view is that the primacy of EU law over pro-
visions of national law in Kosovo derives from the binding force of the 
28 ibid  305.
29 ibid  305.
30 Case 6/65 Flaminio Costa v ENEL, Reference for a preliminary ruling: Giudice concili-
atore di Milano - Italy, judgment of 15 July 1964.  
31 ibid.
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constitutional principle on the prevailing effect of ratified international 
agreements over the national legislation. Article 19(2) of the Constitution 
provides for the primacy of ratified international agreements and legally 
binding norms of international law over Kosovo laws. One can argue that 
ratification of the EU Treaties in conformity with the Constitution would 
sufficiently ensure the supremacy of EU law over the national legislation 
and that no constitutional amendments would be required in the Kosovo 
Constitution to ensure the supremacy of EU law.32 However, as the ex-
perience of Member States has shown, the explicit entrenchment of the 
precedence of EU law at the level of the Constitution is important to en-
sure the consistent application of EU law at the national level. One such 
example is the Croatian Constitution, which states that ‘legal acts and 
decisions accepted by the Republic of Croatia in the institutions of the 
European Union shall apply in the Republic of Croatia in accordance with 
the acquis communautaire’.33  Although the Croatian Constitution does 
not provide explicitly for the primacy of EU law, it does so implicitly given 
the fact that the acquis ‘is by its very nature to be applied in line with the 
principles of direct and interpretative effect and primacy over national 
law, which have been developed by the case law of the Court of Justice’.34 
This is what Judge Rodin has called the constitutional affirmation of the 
fundamental principles on which EU law is founded, which also includes 
the supremacy of EU law and its direct effect on the national legislation.35 
The Slovak Constitution has also provided that legally binding acts of the 
European Communities and European Union shall take precedence over 
the laws of the Slovak Republic.36 The supremacy clause is also included 
32 The ratification of the treaties establishing membership of other international organisa-
tions by virtue of art 18 of the Constitution requires a two-thirds vote of all deputies of 
the Kosovo Assembly. The Kosovo Constitution is silent regarding the hierarchy of legal 
acts. Nowhere in the Kosovo Constitution is there any formal statement of the sources of 
law and of the relationship between them, with the exception of art 16 of the Constitution, 
which provides in clear terms that the Constitution constitutes the highest legal act and 
other laws and other legal acts shall be in conformity with it. On the relationship between 
international law and national law in the case of Kosovo, see Visar Morina, Fisnik Kore-
nica and Dren Doli, ‘The Relationship between International Law and National Law in the 
Case of Kosovo: A Constitutional Perspective’ (2011) International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 274; Kushtrim Istrefi and Visar Morina, ‘Judicial Application of International Law in 
Kosovo’ in Siniša Rodin and Tamara Perišin (eds), Judicial Application of International Law 
in Southeast Europe (Springer 2015).
33 Art 145 of the Croatian Constitution. See more in Rodin and Perišin (n 32).
34 Rodin and Perišin (n 32)148.
35 ibid 148.
36 Article 7(2) of the Slovak Constitution reads: ‘[l]egally binding acts of the European Com-
munities and European Union shall take precedence over the laws of the Slovak Repub-
lic’. See Anneli Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CUP 2005); Anneli Albi and Peter Van Elsuwege. ‘The EU Constitution, National Constitu-
tions and Sovereignty: An Assessment of a “European Constitutional Order”’ (2004) 6 EL 
Rev 741-765; Anneli Albi and Jacques Ziller (eds), The European Constitution and National 
Constitutions: Ratification and Beyond (Kluwer Law International 2007).
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in the Slovenian Constitution pursuant to which legal acts and decisions 
of supranational organisations to which Slovenia is a party are applicable 
in Slovenia in compliance with the legal requirements of the organisa-
tions.37  In view of the above-mentioned constitutional adaptations, the 
most suitable option to accommodate the supremacy of EU law is by in-
troducing a constitutional amendment, which would state the prevalence 
of EU law over the national law, similar to the way this is done in the 
Croatian and Slovak constitutions. In other words, for the purposes of 
ensuring the consistent application of EU law it appears to be necessary 
to adopt a constitutional amendment, which would deal separately with 
the supremacy of EU law over the laws of Kosovo. Such a constitutional 
entrenchment of EU law supremacy would avoid any constitutional am-
biguity about whether or not the precedence of EU law is implied in the 
text of the Constitution and would ensure better compliance with EU 
norms and enhance its implementation through judicial and administra-
tive agencies.
4 Transfer of sovereignty to the EU 
To begin this analysis, accession to the EU affects the sovereignty of 
a state since it implies a certain encroachment on the state sovereignty of 
the acceding state. For this reason, the manner in which state sovereign-
ty is defined in a constitution is an important aspect for the EU accession 
process. Almost all post-communist states in Europe re-formulated their 
‘sovereignty clause’ in national constitutions to be able to gain member-
ship of the EU. As constitutional law scholars argue, the post-communist 
countries had to open up towards international law to be able to join the 
European Union and engaged in ‘a major process of constitutional revi-
sion to enable the transfer of a part of their sovereignty to a highly inte-
grated supranational organization’.38
The Kosovo Constitution, having been drafted under strong interna-
tional supervision, gave special consideration to the way ‘state sovereign-
ty’ is defined. The aim was to ensure that ‘state sovereignty’ was defined 
in a manner that permits the conferral of sovereign powers to interna-
tional organisations. This approach of the Constitution is consistent with 
the objectives of the Constitution’s preamble, which makes an appeal for 
the European integration process.39 There are two constitutional avenues 
37 George Bermann and Katharina Pistor (eds), Law and Governance in an Enlarged Euro-
pean Union (Bloomsbury Publishing 2004).
38 Albi (n 36) 1. See also Ersin Erkan and Antonija Petricusic. ‘Constitutional Challenges 
Ahead the EU Accession: Analysis of the Croatian and Turkish Constitutional Provisions 
that Require Harmonization with the Acquis Communautaire’ (2010) 6 Review of Interna-
tional Law and Policy.
39 Marko (n 6) 437.
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that should be considered to assess whether the Constitution enables 
a partial conferral of powers to supra-national organisations. Article 2 
of the Constitution defines the concept of ‘state sovereignty’ in absolute 
terms by stating that ‘[t]he sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Re-
public of Kosovo is intact, inalienable, indivisible and protected by all 
means provided in this Constitution and the law’. 
One can plausibly argue that the above-mentioned formulation is an 
affirmation of Kosovo’s political will to become an independent state. Oth-
ers argue that the content of article 2 of the Kosovo Constitution should 
be seen in light of the ‘historical and political context since such provi-
sions frequently have the character of a response to political and legal 
problems of the past’, recalling the example of the German Basic Law of 
1949 and that of the US Constitution of 1787.40 But no matter what the 
reasoning behind the purpose of article 2, the Constitution has provided 
the possibility for a transfer of sovereignty to international organisations 
for specific matters in article 20, which states:
The Republic of Kosovo may on the basis of ratified international 
agreements delegate state powers for specific matters to interna-
tional organizations. 
2. If a membership agreement ratified by the Republic of Kosovo 
for its participation in an international organization explicitly 
contemplates the direct applicability of the norms of that organi-
zation, then the law ratifying the international agreement must 
be adopted by two thirds (2/3) vote of all deputies of the As-
sembly, and those norms have superiority over the laws of the 
Republic of Kosovo. 
The wording of article 20 of the Kosovo Constitution is similar to 
article 90 of Poland’s Constitution, which permits Poland through rati-
fied international agreements to ‘delegate to an international organization 
or international institution the competence of organs of State author-
ity in relation to certain matters’.41 The Kosovo Constitution does not 
specify the ‘specific matters’ based on which a conferral of sovereignty to 
an international organisation can be made. But it is assumed that they 
would include membership in international organisations, human rights 
or participation in international mechanisms for collective security. The 
reference in the Constitution that the transfer of sovereignty can be made 
only for ‘specific issues’ is important because it is echoed in the judgment 
40 ibid 437.
41 An English version of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland is available at <www.
sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm> accessed 15 November 2016. For more, see 
Foster (n 19) 211.
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of the German Constitutional Court (GCC) in the Lisbon Treaty case: ‘the 
obligation under European law to respect the constituent power of the 
Member States as the masters of the Treaties corresponds to the non-
transferable identity of the constitution (Article 79.3 of the Basic Law), 
which is not open to integration in this respect’.42 The Kosovo Constitu-
tion does not contain such constitutional provisions that are not open 
to integration, nor has the KCC developed any case law to frame what 
Kosovo’s constitutional identity is. However, as the GCC has warned ‘if 
legislative or administrative competences are only transferred in an un-
specified manner or with a view to further dynamic development, they 
risk transgressing the predetermined integration programme and acting 
beyond the powers granted to them’.43 Therefore, the Constitution’s re-
quirement that state sovereignty cannot be transferred in an unspeci-
fied manner is generally in line with this GCC decision. With regard to 
the content of article 20, the following observations can be made. First, 
despite the fact that the Constitution does not make any explicit refer-
ence to transferring state sovereignty to the EU specifically, a broader 
interpretation appears to suggest that the transfer of power to an interna-
tional organisation is also meant to include ‘a supra-national organisa-
tion’, although many academic commentators argue that the EU is not an 
international organisation in the usual sense.44 Second, the Constitution 
does not require a mandatory referendum to authorise accession to the 
EU, but only requires parliamentary approval in the form of a qualified 
majority by reaching a two-thirds vote of the 120-member Assembly to 
ratify the agreement. This majority requirement to authorise the delega-
tion of sovereignty to an international organisation is also provided in 
other constitutions, such as those of Latvia, Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary 
and Greece.45 Finally there seems not to exist any inviolable core content 
of the constitutional identity in the Kosovo Constitution to generate any 
constitutionally important tension between State willingness for integra-
tion and the principle of conferral. Therefore, unless otherwise required 
by the EU during the pre-accession process, it appears that no consti-
tutional changes will be needed in the Constitution to enable a partial 
transfer of sovereignty to the EU.  
42 The judgment of 30 June 2009 of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on 
the Lisbon Treaty, available at <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entsche-
idungen/EN/2009/06/es20090630_2bve000208en.html> accessed 21 November 2016. 
43 ibid. 
44 Helle Tegner Anker, Birgitte Egelund Olsen and Anita Rønne. ‘Legal Systems and Wind 
Energy: A Comparative Perspective’ (Kluwer Law International 2009) 46; See also Robert 
Schütze ‘European Union Law’ (CUP 2012). 
45 Constitution of Hungary (art 2A); Slovenia (art 3a), Latvia (art 68 para.3).
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5 EU specific issues
In the following section I will analyse some specific issues in the 
Kosovo Constitution, whose content may require adaptation due to the 
European integration process. These specific issues include the right to 
vote and stand as a candidate at municipal elections, the extradition 
of nationals and the freedom of movement, currency and the powers of 
the Kosovo Central Bank. The EU has adopted a catalogue of citizens’ 
rights and it is important to assess whether such segments of the Kosovo 
Constitution are in alignment with EU norms on citizenship rights and 
freedoms.   
5. 1 The right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal 
elections 
Under article 20(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of 
which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a 
candidate at municipal elections in the Member State where he resides, 
under the same conditions as nationals of that State.46 Council Direc-
tive 94/80/EC has laid down detailed arrangements for the exercise of 
the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by 
citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not na-
tionals.47 In fact, active and passive voting rights for EU citizens (former 
article 19 TEU) had previously been introduced in the Maastricht Treaty. 
The introduction of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in mu-
nicipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of 
which they are not nationals has led to constitutional changes both in the 
constitutions of EU Member States and in those of the acceding states 
to ensure compliance with the former article 19(1) EC (now article 20(2) 
TFEU).48 As Anneli Albi argues, ‘the reasons for such amendments lie in 
the traditional constitutional view that voting rights belong to citizens 
due to their inextricable bond with a nation-state, and many constitu-
tions express this principle in some form’.49 In France, the Constitutional 
Council initially declared that EU citizens’ electoral rights in local elec-
46 Article 22 of the TFEU available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT> accessed 18 November 2016.
47 Council Directive 94/80/EC of 19 December 1994 laying down detailed arrangements 
for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by 
citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals [1994] 
OJ L368/38 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:31994L0080 ac-
cessed 18 November 2016. 
48 For more on the voting rights at the EU level, see Jean-Claude Piris. The Lisbon Treaty: 
A Legal and Political Analysis (CUP 2010). See also Federico Fabbrini, Fundamental Rights 
in Europe (OUP 2014).
49 Albi (n 36) 14.
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tions go against the 1958 French Constitution on the grounds that the 
holder of sovereignty in France is the people, therefore only French na-
tionals form the electorate and are entitled to exercise the right to vote.50 
The findings of the French Constitutional Council led to the adoption of 
constitutional amendments to enable ratification of the Treaty by incor-
porating a new article in the French Constitution that gave the right to 
vote and stand as a candidate in municipal elections to citizens of the Un-
ion residing in France.51 Further constitutional changes on voting rights 
were also made in Germany (article 28(1)), Portugal (article 15(5)), Austria 
(articles 23a and 117(2)), Spain (article 13(2)), Belgium (article 8(3)), and 
Croatia (article 146). 
Given the above-mentioned constitutional revisions triggered by the 
EU integration process, we now turn to the Kosovo Constitution to ex-
amine whether a constitutional norm providing for the right to vote is 
compatible with article 20(2) TFEU.  The Kosovo Constitution in its article 
45 provides that ‘every citizen of the Republic of Kosovo who has reached 
the age of eighteen, even if on the day of elections, has the right to elect 
and be elected, unless this right is limited by a court decision’. The con-
tent of the norm implies that ‘nationality’ is one of the key requirements 
for the exercise of the right to vote in Kosovo. Such a requirement should 
be seen merely in the historical context of the enactment of the Kosovo 
Constitution, but it also shows that not much consideration has been 
paid to the fact that local elections are not necessarily a manifestation 
of national sovereignty. A plain reading of article 45 of the Kosovo Con-
stitution clearly implies that it would be impermissible for citizens of 
EU Member States to vote in local elections because the right to vote 
belongs only to Kosovo citizens.52 This being so, article 45 of the Consti-
tution stands in contradiction to article 20(2) TFEU and may have to be 
reworded unless the KCC avoids such a normative collision by holding 
a view similar to that of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (PCT), which 
ruled that ‘granting foreign EU citizens the right to vote and to stand as 
a candidate at local elections does not contradict Article 62(1) of the Con-
stitution, which guarantees Polish citizens the right to elect, inter alia, 
their representatives to organs of local self-government’.53 On this specific 
matter, the PCT did not find any contradiction between the Treaty and 
the Polish Constitution and argued that the ‘constitutional right is not of 
50 Mark Tushnet and Thomas Fleiner, Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (Rout-
ledge 2013) 356.
51 Art 88 of the French Constitution.
52 See more in Rainer Bauböck, ‘Expansive Citizenship – Voting Beyond Territory and 
Membership’ (2005) Political Science and Politics 683.
53 Anna Wyrozumska (ed),  Introduction to Polish Law (Lodz University Press 2005) 26. See 
also Adam Lazowski, Adaptation of the Polish Legal System to European Union Law: Selected 
Aspects (University of Sussex 2001).
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an exclusive character, in the sense that, should the Constitution grant 
it directly to Polish citizens, it might not also be vested in the citizens of 
other States’.54 It is interesting to note that it is precisely this issue that 
sparked intense debate in Poland as to whether EU citizens can partici-
pate in local elections in Poland merely on the basis of the Electoral Law 
and without amending the Constitution. 
While this issue can be further discussed during screening and ne-
gotiations with the EU during the pre-accession process, there are differ-
ent models of constitutional adaptations that can be followed to ensure 
compliance with the requirements of the Treaty on voting rights. One such 
example is the Croatian Constitution, which introduced constitutional af-
firmation of EU citizens’ rights by providing that ‘all rights guaranteed by 
the European Union acquis communautaire shall be enjoyed by all citizens 
of the European Union’.55 Other examples vary, from those constitutions 
which for elections for local self-government provide direct entitlement to 
non-nationals who have settled in a State for a longer period of time de-
termined by a separate law (for example, the Hungarian Constitution) to 
where the right to elect and be elected to local public administration bodies 
is guaranteed for EU citizens who comply with the requirements of organ-
ic law (the Romanian Constitution).56 While these examples can serve as 
guidance to legislative authority in Kosovo, there is, of course, some degree 
of flexibility on the part of the acceding state regarding constitutional ar-
rangements that can be made to ensure that EU citizens’ right to vote and 
to stand as a candidate at local elections is duly ensured.
5.2 Extradition of nationals
The Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Ar-
rest Warrant and other surrender procedures between Member States 
(Framework Decision) was enacted to abolish in the framework of the Eu-
ropean Union the formal extradition procedure in respect of persons who 
are fleeing justice after having been finally sentenced and to speed up the 
extradition procedures in respect of persons suspected of having commit-
ted a criminal offence.57 The Framework Decision led to abolishing classi-
54 Judgment of 11 May 2005 – Ref. No. K 18/04. The judgment is available at <http://
trybunal.gov.pl/uploads/media/SiM_LI_EN_calosc.pdf> accessed 21 November 2016.
55 Constitution of Croatia, art 146.
56 Constitution of Romania, art 16. The text of the Constitution is available at <http://
www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act2_2&par1=2#t2c2s0sba36> accessed 21 Novem-
ber 2016.
57 Council Framework decision No 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Ar-
rest Warrant and other surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ  L190, 1. 
For more on constitutional aspects of the European Arrest Warrant, see Oreste Pollicino, 
‘European Arrest Warrant and Constitutional Principles of the Member States: A Case Law-
Based Outline in the Attempt to Strike the Right Balance between Interacting Legal Sys-
tems’ (2008)  9(10) German Law Journal 1313; Daniel Sarmiento, ‘European Union: The 
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cal extradition between individual Member States and replacing it with a 
system of surrender between individual judicial authorities. Accordingly, 
persons suspected of having committed a criminal offence will no longer 
be turned over on the basis of an individual act of the executing state, 
but directly on the basis of a court decision in the requesting EU Mem-
ber State, which thus has direct effect in the executing state. The activi-
ties of central authorities are replaced by cooperation between individual 
courts, and the role of the central authorities is thus limited to practical 
and administrative assistance. From a national constitutional law per-
spective, the outcome was that the implementation of the Framework 
Decision encountered serious constitutional challenges in the Member 
States given that national constitutions protected their citizens from ex-
tradition. To put it differently, the enactment of the EAW has, in turn, 
led to constitutional revisions in countries such as Slovenia, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Croatia.58 In Croatia, the constitution did not allow extra-
dition of its citizens to another state, and in order to enable the imple-
mentation of the Directive it was necessary to amend the Constitution 
to permit Croatian citizens to be forcibly extradited to another State in 
the case of the execution of a decision on extradition in compliance with 
an international treaty or the acquis communautaire of the European 
Union.59 In some Member States, the implementation of the EAW was 
contested on constitutional grounds before constitutional courts, as in 
Poland and the Czech Republic. Having been confronted with this issue, 
the Polish Constitutional Court ruled that the surrender of its citizens 
to a Member State is incompatible with constitutional rights and free-
doms.60 The Czech Constitutional Court, on the other hand, succeeded to 
‘reconcile the constitutional prohibition of forcing a person to leave his or 
European Arrest Warrant and the Quest for Constitutional Coherence (2008) 6(1) Interna-
tional Journal of Constitutional Law 171; Adam Lazowski, ‘Poland: Constitutional Tribunal 
on the Surrender of Polish Citizens under the European Arrest Warrant. Decision of 27 
April 2005’ (2005) 1(3) European Constitutional Law Review 569.
58 Art 47 of the Slovene Constitution; art 25(3) of the Bulgarian Constitution; art 19(1) of 
the Romanian Constitution.
59 Art 9 of the Croatian Constitution provides that ‘a citizen of the Republic of Croatia may 
not be forcibly exiled from the Republic of Croatia nor deprived of citizenship, nor extradited 
to another state, except in case of execution of a decision on extradition or surrender made 
in compliance with an international treaty or the acquis communautaire of the European 
Union’. For more, see Anthony Moore and Mario Chiavario, Police and Judicial Co-operation 
in the European Union: FIDE 2004 National Reports (CUP 2004) 37. See also Zdeněk Kühn, 
‘The European Arrest Warrant, Third Pillar Law and National Constitutional Resistance/Ac-
ceptance: The EAW Saga as Narrated by the Constitutional Judiciary in Poland, Germany, 
and the Czech Republic’ (2007) 3 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 99. 
60 Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of 27 April 2005, Case P 1/05. English trans-
lation available at < http://trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/omowienia/P_1_05_full_
GB.pdf> accessed 21 November 2016 . See also House of Lords, European Union Commit-
tee. ‘European Arrest Warrant – Recent Developments’ (HL 2005-06, 156). The document is 
available at <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/156/156.
pdf> accessed 22 November 2016. 
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her homeland with the EU obligation of surrendering one’s citizens to an-
other member state’ by concluding that the implementation of the EAW 
framework decision does not violate the Czech Constitution.61 
We now turn to article 35(4) of the Kosovo Constitution to assess 
whether its content is compatible with the EAW framework. Article 35(4) 
provides that Kosovo citizens ‘shall not be extradited from Kosovo against 
their will except for cases when otherwise required by international law 
and agreements’.62 There are two important aspects that should be con-
sidered as far as compliance with the EAW is concerned. First, as op-
posed to the above-mentioned constitutions, the Kosovo Constitution 
does not place a complete ban on the surrender of its citizens to other 
jurisdictions. And second, while it provides that the forcible extradition 
of its citizens is prohibited, extradition of citizens to foreign jurisdictions 
can be made effective if required by rules of international law or follow-
ing an international agreement which Kosovo authorities have ratified. 
In addition, the Kosovo Constitution, as amended, goes even further by 
allowing any person accused of crimes before the Specialist Chambers 
to be detained on remand and transferred to specialist chambers sitting 
outside the territory of Kosovo.63 Therefore, in contrast to those countries 
in which the European Arrest Warrant has been found to be in conflict 
with the constitution, the extradition of Kosovo citizens to foreign juris-
dictions does not seem to cause any constitutional issue in Kosovo. Thus, 
implementation of the Framework Decision should not require any con-
stitutional amendment, except the requirement for transposing the EAW, 
when Kosovo joins the EU.
5.3 Freedom of movement, currency and the powers of the Central 
Bank
Another issue is related to freedom of movement, the currency and 
the power of the Central Bank in Kosovo in respect of whether they are 
compatible with the TFEU.  It should be recalled that freedom of move-
ment is one of the core rights, which derives from the EU citizenship 
concept. Article 21 TFEU guarantees citizens of the Union the right to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, while 
article 45 TFEU provides that ‘freedom of movement for workers shall be 
61 Marise Cremona, Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law (OUP 2012) 141. See the 
Czech Constitutional Court Judgment of 3 May 2006 (66/04). 
62 The Law on International Legal Cooperation in Criminal Matters regulates further con-
ditions and procedures regarding the international legal assistance in criminal matters, 
including extradition of Kosovo citizens to foreign national jurisdictions. The law is avail-
able at www.md-ks.net/repository/docs/Ligji_per_bashkepunim_Juridik_(anglisht).pdf 
accessed 22 November 2016. 
63 See amendment no 24 of the Kosovo Constitution, art 162(8), which is available at 
<https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDetail.aspx?ActID=10997> accessed 22 November 2016.
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secured within the Union’.  Freedom of movement is one of the key in-
struments for the EU and its Member States to ensure competition and 
movement of goods and services. In its decision in the D’Hoop case, the 
Court of Justice of the EU argued that: 
In that a citizen of the Union must be granted in all Member 
States the same treatment in law as that accorded to nationals of 
those Member States who find themselves in the same situation, 
it would be incompatible with the right of freedom of movement 
were a citizen, in the Member State of which he is a national, to 
receive treatment less favourable than he would enjoy if he had 
not availed himself of the opportunities offered by the Treaty in 
relation to freedom of movement.64
To comply with the requirements of the TFEU, constitutions of the 
EU Member States guarantee the freedom of movement to everyone with-
out limitations on nationality. For example, the Croatian Constitution 
states that ‘anyone lawfully within the territory of the Republic of Croatia 
shall enjoy freedom of movement and freedom to choose his/her resi-
dence’ while the Slovenian Constitution provides that ‘everyone has the 
right to freedom of movement, to choose his place of residence, to leave 
the country and to return at any time’.65 The freedom of movement is also 
conferred on everyone according to article 52 of Poland’s Constitution 
and article 23 of the Slovak Constitution. 
From a broader perspective, freedom of movement remains one of 
the biggest challenges for Kosovo citizens since they remain the only citi-
zens in the Western Balkans who are unable to travel without a visa to 
EU countries. Kosovo citizens can travel visa-free only to a few countries 
in the immediate neighbourhood, which makes Kosovo ‘one of the most 
isolated places on earth’.66 While in May 2016 the European Commission 
proposed to the Council and the European Parliament the lifting of visa 
requirements for the people of Kosovo by transferring Kosovo to the visa-
free list for short-stays in the Schengen area, the proposal has not been 
approved yet by the European Parliament and the Council, and Kosovo 
citizens continue to be deprived of exercising one of the most fundamen-
tal rights of the TFEU.67 From the perspective of Kosovo’s Constitution, 
64 Case C-224/98 MN D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191.
65 Article 32 of the Croatian Constitution. See art 52 of the Slovenian Constitution.
66  European Stability Initiative, ‘Isolating Kosovo? Kosovo vs Afghanistan 5:22’ (ESI Dis-
cussion Paper (Online) 19 November 2009) 2. Available at <www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_docu-
ment_id_111.pdf> accessed 17 March 2016.
67 European Commission, ‘European Commission Proposes Visa-free Travel for the People 
of Kosovo (Press Release, 4 May 2016) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1626_
en.htm> accessed 10 October 2016.
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freedom of movement is one of the basic fundamental rights entrenched 
in Chapter 2. Article 35(1) of the Kosovo Constitution provides that every 
citizen of Kosovo or a foreigner who is a legal resident of Kosovo has the 
right to move freely throughout the territory of Kosovo and to choose 
his/her location of residence. As is seen, article 35(4) of the Constitu-
tion distinguishes between ‘nationals’ of Kosovo and ‘foreigners’ who are 
legally residing in Kosovo as far as the exercise of freedom of movement 
is concerned. While it is not entirely clear what a ‘foreign legal resident’ 
means in the context of article 35(4) of the Constitution, the Kosovo Law 
on Foreigners, which regulates the conditions of the entry, movement, 
residence and employment of foreigners in the territory of Kosovo, states 
that a ‘foreigner’ is any person who is not a citizen of Kosovo.68 Given the 
above-mentioned distinction and the legal uncertainty that may arise, 
article 35(4) of the Kosovo Constitution should be reformulated to ensure 
that freedom of movement is guaranteed to everyone without limitations 
on nationality. As noted above, the Treaty within the scope of its appli-
cation prohibits any discrimination on the rights of movement (art 18 
TFEU) on the grounds of nationality, and article 35 of the Kosovo Con-
stitution should be brought into harmony with article 21 TFEU.  One 
could argue that a maximalist interpretative approach can imply that 
the Kosovo Constitution may not require constitutional amendment with 
regard to freedom of movement since article 20 TFEU accords every per-
son holding the nationality of a Member State the status of citizen of the 
Union. Therefore, the Treaty provisions on freedom of movement would 
apply in the Kosovo constitutional order as well when Kosovo joins the 
EU. As mentioned earlier, much will depend on whether such an inter-
pretation will be considered adequate, and thus a formal constitutional 
amendment on freedom of movement would be avoided.
For readers it would also be interesting to briefly discuss whether 
the Kosovo Constitution contains provisions on the issuing of currency 
and the powers of the Central Bank since such provisions have caused 
problems in some Member States that joined in 2004. For example, be-
fore Estonia joined the EU in 2004, the Estonian Supreme Court was 
confronted with a constitutional question as to whether article 111 of the 
Estonian Constitution (which provided that only the Estonian Central 
Bank has the right to issue currency in Estonia) complies with EU law. 
The Estonian Supreme Court ruled that Estonia was ‘entitled to join the 
euro-zone, as the Treaties take precedence over its constitution’.69 The 
Kosovo Constitution talks about currency and the Central Bank in gen-
eral terms. Article 11 of the Constitution provides that Kosovo ‘uses as 
68 Law no 04/l-219 on foreigners, art 3. The law is available at <https://gzk.rks-gov.net/
ActDetail.aspx?ActID=8876> accessed 21 November 2016. 
69 Chalmers (n 23) 190.
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legal tender one single currency’ but does not specify what that currency 
is, although Kosovo has used the Euro as an official currency since 2002. 
As far as the Central Banking Authority (CBA) is concerned, the Consti-
tution only states that the CBA is an independent authority but does not 
state that the CBA has any exclusive power to issue national currency. 
Hence, unlike the case of Estonia, the Kosovo Constitution does not seem 
to require any constitutional adjustment regarding currency provisions 
and the CBA’s competence to issue currency.  
6 Conclusion
While it is undisputed that ratification of the Stabilisation and As-
sociation Agreement with the EU has advanced Kosovo in terms of the 
EU integration process, Kosovo is still far from EU accession. Therefore, 
a screening of its Constitution for compliance with EU law is not yet 
required, at least not formally. This article, however, has discussed pro-
spective constitutional amendments which may arise when Kosovo is 
able to join the European Union. As we have noted, the Kosovo Consti-
tution is one of the newest in Europe and its content generally permits 
the EU integration process, which is one of the major objectives of the 
Constitution’s preamble. However, as the experience of other Member 
States has shown in the process of preparations for accession, there are 
several issues in the Kosovo Constitution that may require modifica-
tion as the country approaches the process of European integration. Key 
among them are the ‘partial transfer of sovereignty’ and the ‘precedence 
of EU law’, to which the Kosovo Constitution indirectly refers. Still, as 
the article has shown, there remain some specific constitutional issues 
that should be considered in light of pre-accession adaptations, such as 
the right to vote and stand in local government elections, the freedom of 
movement and the extradition of nationals, which will require constitu-
tional adjustment through constitutional amendments. Unquestionably, 
as noted above, additional constitutional changes other than those pre-
sented above can yet arise during negotiations with the EU to meet the 
requirements of integration into the EU legal system. Speaking of this, it 
might be possible that some EU integration issues affecting the Kosovo 
Constitution may be addressed within Chapter 23, which deals with the 
judiciary and fundamental rights. But, until then, the findings of this ar-
ticle can serve as a preliminary orientation regarding the Constitution’s 
compliance with EU law and potential constitutional adjustments, which 
will derive from the EU pre-accession process.
